Published in the January 2006 Issue
of Law & Order Magazine
by Thomas Aveni
A gradual but continuous erosion of the discretionary latitude afforded
to law enforcement professionals has taken place. One such discretionary
issue, never seriously scrutinized in years past, is the latitude
officers have been given in determining when to unholster their handgun.
Officers learn, from their earliest days of training and experience, to
assess the potential risk associated with a call for service (CFS) in
conjunction with the situational nature of that call. Often the very
nature of the CFS will influence an officer’s decision to unholster his
handgun soon after arrival to the dispatched location. The vast majority
of times this occurs, it is objectively reasonable.
If, for instance, an officer is responding to an armed robbery in
progress, it would be unreasonable to expect an officer to wait until a
threat becomes manifest before unholstering his handgun. You can apply
this perspective to any number of higher risk calls for service that an
officer might confront in a tour of duty.
Of course, many calls for service don’t fully parlay to the officer the
extent of risk that he might face. A reported domestic disturbance
complaint might not offer preliminary indications pertinent to whether a
party or parties of that incident are exhibiting signs of aggravated
aggression or whether and to what extent they happen to the armed. Under
such circumstances we would expect to see an officer assess the totality
of circumstances present to determine whether unholstering his handgun
is warranted at that time, or as events unfold.
Often, an officer will unholster his handgun when a threat of aggravated
aggression seems imminent. And, it should be noted here, that perception
of an imminent threat might be to a third-party rather than to the
officer himself. Distance from a perceived threat is relevant but
elastic in nature. If, for instance, the officer confronts a violent or
irrational subject at a distance of 50 feet, armed with a knife, it
would be prudent for that officer to have his handgun unholstered.
The worst possible scenario an officer might confront is where there was
no outward sign of impending danger and the officer must react to
aggravated aggression without warning. When the officer is confronted
with immediate danger, there may not be an adequate amount of time or
distance to unholster the handgun and respond with deadly force quickly
and decisively enough to assure self-preservation. While such scenarios
don’t reflect the statistical norm, they do occur with enough regularity
to be of considerable concern.
Tactical Advantages
One the primary advantages cited for having one’s handgun unholstered is
the drastic reduction of time needed to respond to a lethal threat.
Previous studies have suggested that an officer can react with an
unholstered handgun 66 to 75% faster than he could respond with a
holstered handgun. The difference is obviously more pronounced with
Level-Three type security holsters, but the response range for a
holstered handgun is generally 1.5 to 2.0 seconds.
An officer can typically respond to an imminent threat from a “ready”
handgun in roughly 0.5 seconds. Given the close proximity of most lethal
confrontations, and given the fact that most officers can fire four
rounds in one second, the difference in reaction times generated from
holstered and unholstered handguns have substantive survival
implications.
Additionally, we tend to see officers apply shots fired with more
precision when given additional time to react (i.e., with an unholstered
handgun). The reasons for this are often simple enough. Officers tend to
establish a more tenuous grip on their handguns when responding in haste
and this issue tends to be exacerbated by the process of unholstering
the weapon, especially from a security holster.
In addition, many officers will exhibit grossly exaggerated motions
(jerking, swaying, shoulder dipping, etc) when forced to fire quickly
from the holster. We could reasonably expect such counterproductive
traits to be become exaggerated under stress. So, in the final analysis,
we could reasonably expect a meaningful difference in shot placement
between officers responding to lethal threats with holstered and
unholstered handguns.
There is another critical advantage derived from having one’s handgun
unholstered. Many instructors will readily tell you how what they’ve
seen in training mirrors is what we see on the street: that an
unholstered handgun conveys a readiness and willingness to use deadly
force that often elicits subject compliance without shots being fired.
Conversely, a holstered handgun may encourage (as it seems to with
regularity in force-on-force training) an adversary to take his chances
that he’ll be able to act against the officer before he can react.
Tactical Disadvantages
When does the unholstered handgun become a tactical liability? In simple
terms: when the gun isn’t needed, and when having both hands free is
critical. Over the years that I’ve been digesting police shooting
narratives, I couldn’t begin to enumerate the number of times I’ve found
instances in which officers have inadvertently shot someone they were
trying to subdue while having their handguns unholstered.
Another infrequent but troublesome behavioral quirk we continue to see
is the use of the unholstered handgun as an impact weapon. I’ve recently
screened cases for attorneys that have involved either “pistol whipping”
(where the gun ultimately went off, killing the subject struck with the
handgun) or forcible vehicle extraction (where an officer used his
handgun to break the side driver’s window of a vehicle that had been
involved in a pursuit, only to have the handgun discharge and kill the
driver).
Murphy’s Law certainly applies to the chaotic world in which police
routinely unholster their handguns. If it can happen, it probably will.
That brings up another related and critical issue: handgun retention.
Over the last 15 years, with mass adoption of retention holsters, we’ve
seen the numbers of officers slain with their own handguns diminish from
roughly one in five officers killed annually, to fewer than one in ten
officers slain. True, officers may be more aware of handgun retention as
an issue than they were 20 years ago, but we haven’t seen any
substantive increase in handgun retention training in that span, so the
bulk of the credit likely belongs with retention holsters.
Having conceded that, one also has to concede that such a benefit is
only derived from having a handgun properly holstered in a retention
holster. There will be situations where we may have plenty of inducement
to reholster our handguns hastily, when the situation warrants doing so.
Consequently, it’s not unusual to see a handgun retention incident arise
where an officer had his gun initially unholstered, and then reholstered
in such haste that one or more snaps were not secured - negating the
full value of a Level Three holster when a struggle ensued.
While extolling the perceived benefit of possible compliance-inducement
that an unholstered handgun might provide, we should look at contrary
arguments. There will be times when an unholstered handgun might provoke
irrational or emotionally agitated subjects into behavior associated
with an escalated risk of confrontation.
Certainly, there may be times when having your handgun drawn is
objectively reasonable, and where keeping it inconspicuous is desirable.
If you sense a need to have the weapon drawn in such circumstances,
consider using visual obstructions (doors, trees, chairs, etc.) to veil
or obscure the status of the handgun.
The so-called “boot-leg” position (weapon is drawn, but kept obscured
behind the strong-side leg) is a viable alternative in some cases,
though it may not obscure the handgun well enough to keep it from
becoming provocative.
Officers carrying handguns in an off-duty or plainclothes capacity have
an additional concern: that their unholstered handgun may leave them
vulnerable to “friendly fire,” either from uniformed officers, or
perhaps by citizens who are more frequently carrying legally concealed
handguns of their own these days. When in plain clothes, assume nothing.
Your short hair and clean-shaven look may not help identify you as an
officer as it may have 20 years ago. Let the world know who you are when
the gun comes out, and exhibit your police ID as expeditiously as
possible. Otherwise, consider alternatives to presenting your handgun,
such as situational extrication!
Operational Considerations
There have been a number of noticeable firearms training trends in
recent years that have been attributable to a “trickle-down” of SWAT
tactics to beat cops. As one might have predicted, there have been both
positive and negative outcomes associated with that process.
One such possible “negative” is that of applying the “muzzle dominance”
concept to street applications. The term “muzzle dominance” is believed
to have originated in the hostage-rescue realm, whereby hostage rescue
teams assault a plane, bus, or train not knowing who and where the
hostage-takers are, as they are likely intermingled with hostages.
The muzzle dominance tactic therefore arose out of necessity, as team
members would storm narrow pathways between a sea of humanity,
ascertaining as they go, who is compliant with their authoritative
commands and muzzle disposition, and who isn’t. Where this tactic has
its place, it is above challenge.
However, most beat cops haven’t been trained to that level of competency
for storming anything formidable, let alone where hostages might be
involved. So, to beat cops we must continue to implore: “never point
your muzzle at anything you aren’t willing to destroy.” Consequently,
the “Third-Eye Technique,” which often entails the handgun muzzle
sweeping everything in the officer’s search pathway, is NOT a technique
that should be universally taught to beat cops.
Training Considerations
For reasons all too obvious, and yet seldom addressed, officers must
learn to reholster their handguns without looking, and without using
their support hand. We generally need to keep our vision focused on
people or areas of concern, and we often need our support hand free to
fend off attacks or maintain physical control of noncompliant subjects.
Retention holsters are a proven, officer survival device, but we must
ensure that officers are trained to a level of subconscious competency
with them, and that we have met manufacturer’s recommendations for their
break-in. Until these two issues have been addressed, we are likely to
see labored handgun presentation and a resultant detriment in accurate,
time-compressed shot placement.
The divide between having justification for having a handgun unholstered
and having justification to have the weapon pointed at people is
significant. Accordingly, muzzle and trigger-finger discipline are
absolute training prerequisites if we are to enjoy continued
discretionary latitude in when we are permitted to unholster our
handguns.
Policy Considerations
While many agencies are defining or categorizing an unholstered handgun
as a reportable “use of force,” this approach is both extreme and
unnecessary. If agencies wish to document the frequency in which
officers use their handguns to “cover-down” on subjects, the distinction
between unholstering and covering-down should be clearly made.
Cover-down documentation could be used very constructively, as it would
typically illustrate how frequently police challenge suspects, and how
infrequently they actually use deadly force. As is usually the case,
restrictive policy is not a reasonable or effective substitute for
purpose-driven training.
Occupational safety concern establishes many operational imperatives.
Allowing officers the discretionary latitude to unholster their handguns
situationally needn’t be perceived as an operational liability. If
officers have been properly trained and regulated through thoughtful
policy parameters, continued discretionary latitude regarding when to
unholster handguns should be of diminished concern.
Thomas Aveni, M.S. is a staff researcher and
consultant with the Police Policy Studies Council. He can be contacted
at
tom@theppsc.org.
©2004 The Police Policy Studies Council. All rights reserved.
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